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COMMENTS
appoint counsel in serious misdemeanor cases to ensure that such
convictions will not be overruled by cases expanding the right
and, more important, to ensure full implementation of this fun-
damental human right.
2. Counsel must be appointed before the defendant pleads.
The better practice, especially in the more serious cases, would
be to appoint soon after arrest.
3. It is not required by the Supreme Court that counsel be
appointed immediately after arrest, but the bench and bar should
realize that this may be required in the event Escobedo is ex-
tended.
4. Full implementation of the right requires thorough and
complete explanation to a defendant of the right and its scope;
perfunctory reference to the right is not sufficient.
Lee Hargrave
REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES OF
APPPOINTED COUNSEL
The decision in the Gideon case, in 1963 has emphasized sev-
eral problems in the administration of criminal justice. Among
them are the following: when to appoint counsel, how to select
counsel, how to finance alternatives to the appointed counsel
system, whether to provide compensation for appointed counsel,
and whether to reimburse appointed counsel for expenses. This
Comment will attempt an exploration of the last of these ques-
'tions, with emphasis on the practical need for reimbursement,
the difficulties involved in securing reimbursement, and the
practice in Louisiana as compared to the federal system and the
other states.
THE PROBLEM
Gideon v. Wainwright established that an indigent accused
of a felony has an absolute right to the assistance of counsel
for his defense. Enforcement of the decision has made necessary
a great increase in the number of attorneys representing in-
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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digent defendants. This is not to say that appointments were
not being made before the decision, but rather that the clear
necessity which the decision determined has forced many states
to change their methods of appointment and to widen the classes
of cases in which counsel is appointed. The growing number of
attorneys appointed in such cases tends to multiply problems
which were present but not very apparent in the previously
existing context of indigent defense.
The basic problem is who is to pay the cost of defending the
indigent. Certainly the indigent cannot pay it. Unless assistance
is made available by such organizations as charitable founda-
tions or the United Fund, there are only two sources of funds,
the prosecuting jurisdiction and the appointed counsel. In a
majority of jurisdictions in the United States the burden has
fallen on the court-appointed attorneys.2 But it should be added
that part of the burden may sometimes have fallen on the in-
digent defendants, in the form of an inadequate effort by im-
pecunious counsel.
Two examples will delineate the main area of concern.
John Smith is arrested on a charge of robbery in New Or-
leans, his home. The crime occurred on December 2, 1965, at
about 11:00 A.M. His description is quite similar to that given
by the victim. Smith was actually in Baton Rouge on that day to
see an old friend who was passing through on his way to the
West Coast to look for a job. The friend would be an excellent
witness and the jury could not help but believe him. Smith can-
not afford a lawyer, so the court must appoint one for him.
However, owing to lack of funds, Smith cannot hire an investi-
gator to look for the missing friend. John Smith, who has a
perfect alibi, is convicted, even though he had a capable lawyer,
a fair-minded judge and prosecutor, and an honest jury.
Or suppose that Smith is arrested for forgery. He is indicted
and a lawyer is appointed to defend him. The local police crime
laboratory's handwriting expert is the chief witness against
Smith. He is a capable man, but not infallible. The defense could
call in an expert of its own who would show definitely that the
police expert is mistaken and that Smith did not commit the for-
gery of which he is accused. However, the fee for this expert is
substantial. Smith cannot bear the expense, and his appointed
2. I SnvEmST iN, DEFENSE 6F THE POOR 16 (1965).
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lawyer probably cannot either. The inevitable result is that
Smith will be convicted.
Similar cases can be imagined in which the vital factor is
the inability of the defendant to secure a piece of physical evi-
dence, to locate a missing witness, or to obtain the services of an
expert in any one of a dozen fields. In each case the accused
may be provided with competent counsel and the proceedings
may be completely fair, but will be convicted of a crime of which
a man of means would probably have been acquitted.3
In practical effect what is happening is that the indigent too
often gets a second-class form of justice. The appointed attor-
ney, who is seldom happy with such an assignment, particularly
if he has a busy practice, may feel that he must forego the com-
plete investigation he would make for a paying client. This often
will mean a plea of guilty being entered where such a plea
should not have been made. The practice of some judges to
appoint counsel from among attorneys present in the courtroom
is especially conducive to a kind of "instant justice."
Admittedly, examples of this sort are not in keeping with the
ethical standards of the bar. However, the present widespread
practice of not reimbursing counsel may force counsel to choose
between severe financial hardship and the ethical ideal.4 As one
attorney from a rural parish in Louisiana put the problem:
"Sure, the first five cases you are appointed to, you expend
every effort to try to find all the witnesses for the defend-
ant, and take whatever time is necessary to fully prepare a
defense. But about the sixth case you begin to work from
the position of whether the man is guilty or not and not how
much the State can prove against him. As a result, you just
don't do as much to protect his rights at every turn as you
would do for the banker's son who could afford to pay you a
fee of $5,000. You lose some sleep over it, but what can you
do when you have an office full of clients who want service
and you have to hold everything until the criminal appoint-
ment case is finished? ' 5
3. For examples of actual cases of this type, see FRANK & FRANK, NOT
GUILTY (1957) and BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932).
4. Ervin, Uncompensated Counsel: They Do Not Meet the Constitutional
Mandate, 49 A.B.A.J. 435, 436 (1963).
5. Statement to writer.
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The problem grows with the increasing costs of an adequate
defense. The defense attorney, to present his client in the most
favorable light, must know as much as possible about him and
about the case which the prosecution has against him. But in
the best circumstances the defense attorney can hardly hope to
match the resources available to the prosecution.
"The growth of the modern American police force and prose-
cutor has been understandably mercurial. From the local
constabulary to the national F.B.I., there are approximately
40,000 police jurisdictions in the United States. The total
police personnel in this country numbers about 300,000."6
"It is, of course, not only with numbers of investigators and
prosecutors that the lonely individual is confronted when
caught up in the criminal law processes. State, federal, and
many local police officers and prosecutors are full-time, ex-
tensively trained and highly qualified professionals, assisted
by the speed and mobility of the car and plane, the facility
of electrical and electronic communication, the sciences of
moulage, dactyloscopy, microscopy, ballistics, handwriting
analysis and serology, as well as the less acceptable - al-
though regarded as essential by the police - auxiliaries of
informer, wire tap, lie detector and narcoanalysis." 7
"Pitted against the crushing complex of the power of the
police and prosecution, the accused individual is helpless ex-
cept for the countervailing defenses erected by the Constitu-
tion, and even with those he may be pitifully frail."8
"At the trial stage the growing imbalance between State and
accused is another reminder that Constitutional rights are
not self-enforcing and, unless implemented, are inadequate to
dissipate the twentieth century disparity between the re-
sources available to the criminal trial combatants."
In effect, the practice of not supplying appointed counsel
with adequate funds to conduct a defense has negated the ef-
fectiveness of counsel.
6. BOTEIN & GORDON, THE TRIAL OF THE FUTURE 58 (1963).
7. Ibid.
8. Id. at 64.
9. Id. at 69.
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL "MANDATE"
The question whether the Constitution requires that ap-
pointed counsel be reimbursed by the state for the expenses
of defending an indigent is yet to be presented to the Supreme
Court. The Court, however, seems to be moving toward the posi-
tion that due process and equal protection require that every
person accused of crime should have a full opportunity to present
his defense, regardless of financial condition. This idea has been
stated most clearly in the opinions of Justice Douglas:
"In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on ac-
count of poverty than on account of religion, race or color."' 1
"There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man
gets depends on the amount of money he has.""
"There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth
Amendment where the rich man . . . enjoys the benefit of
counsel's examination into the record, research of the law,
and marshalling of arguments in his behalf, while the in-
digent ... is forced to shift for himself.'
12
THE FEDERAL POSITION
At present the position in the federal courts under the
Criminal Justice Act of 196413 is that counsel may be reimbursed
for all reasonable expenses, and funds in a limited amount are
available for expert witnesses and investigative services. This
should largely solve the problem of appointed counsel in the fed-
eral courts. Before passage of the Criminal Justice Act, the
apparent position in the federal courts as expressed by the Ninth
Circuit in Dillon v. United States14 was that, in the absence of
statutory authority, there was no basis for any reimbursement
of appointed counsel. The reasoning in this case was that at-
torneys are officers of the court and consent to the appointments
without reimbursement, or compensation, as a condition of ad-
mittance of the bar. This was in accord with the majority of the
state court decisions on the subject and, as the Ninth Circuit
10. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
11. Id. at 19.
12. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
13. 78 Stat. 552, 18 U.S.C.A. 3006A (1964).
14. 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965).
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claimed, with the historical nature of the relationship of the
attorney to the court system. 15
THE POSITION IN STATES OTHER THAN LOUISIANA
At the present time nine of the fifty states and the District
of Columbia provide specifically for reimbursement of the ex-
penses of appointed counsel. 6 In many of the other states, ap-
pointed counsel are paid by increasing the compensation allowed
by statute in an amount sufficient to cover reasonable expenses
without making an allowance for them specifically.'7 In the
thirteen jurisdictions that afford complete reimbursement, the
only requirement seems to be a showing that the expenses were
reasonably necessary. 8
In many of the states which have only limited reimburse-
ment, or none at all, there have been recommendations from the
bar that adequate funds be made available. Even in states which
allow reimbursement, it is often true that securing the return
of expense money is difficult and time-consuming. This com-
plaint is particularly prevalent in New Jersey, where lawyers
have found that the cost in time of filling out the required forms
to secure reimbursement is often more than the actual expenses
themselves.19
The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, is the source of
the leading opinion on the inherent power of the courts to order
reimbursement of expenses to appointed counsel. In State v.
Horton O the limits of reimbursement were defined:
"A word should be said about the matter of out-of-pocket
expenses of defense, including expenditures of the assigned
attorney himself. Customarily, and we think properly so, the
reasonable costs of necessary items such as experts, whether
witnesses or not, medical examinations, scientific tests, pho-
tographs, depositions and transcripts, and, in essential cir-
cumstances, professional investigation, have been ordered
paid from public funds by trial courts. The Constitutional
obligation to furnish counsel to an indigent can sensibly only
15. Id. at 636.
16. 1 SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR 16 (1965).
17. Ibid.
18. 2 & 3 id. (State Reports).
19. 3 id. at 476.
20. 34 N.J. 518, 170 A.2d 1 (1961).
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be construed to include as well that which is necessary to
proper defense in addition to the time and professional ef-
forts of an attorney, and we have no doubt of the inherent
power of a court to require such to be provided at public
expense. Cf. Griffin v. People of State of Illinois, 76 S.Ct.
585, 352 U.S. 12, 100 L.Ed 891 (1956) .... We think the
assigned attorney is also entitled to receive reimbursement
on the same theory for his reasonable and necessary mis-
cellaneous out-of-pocket disbursements not falling within the
more extensive categories mentioned. We have in mind not
those items like office stenographic and clerk services, sup-
plies, local telephone charges, postage, meals and the like
which ordinarily constitute a part of general office overhead
and are not usually charged by the average attorney to the
paying client, but rather things such as traveling expenses
outside the local area, toll telephone charges and incidental
investigation disbursements, capable of specific itemiza-
tion., " 2
This is unusually generous treatment, but it may indicate the
direction in which the states are moving. There would, however,
be a good deal of quarrelling with the position that power to
direct reimbursement is inherent in the courts. Most states have
considered that there is no such power in the courts, and that
authority for such payments can come only from the legisla-
ture 2
THE LOUISIANA POSITION
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, Louisiana has made
possible the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants.23
With the exception of one parish,24 this is the only concession
made to an accused because of his indigence, at least on the
trial level.2 5 At present no allowance is made to appointed coun-
sel for his expenses, though there is some evidence of coopera-
21. Id. at 534, 170 A.2d at 9.
22. See cases cited in Dillion v. United States, 346 F.2d 633, 637 (9th Cir.
1965).
23. LA. R.S. 15:143 (1950).
24. Id. 15:868, limited to cases involving inmates of the Louisiana State
Penitentiary.
25. See id. 15:555, dealing with right of accused to have testimony transcribed
and provisions for paying therefor. See also United States ev rel. Weston v.
Sigler, 308 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Op. ATT'Y GEN. LA. (June 14, 1965), to
the effect that an indigent accused is entitled to a transcript on appeal, paid
for by the parish.
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tion from the police and district attorneys in supplying infor-
mation which helps reduce costs of investigation.
The case law offers no prospect of change. State v. Sim-
mons26 indicates that Louisiana is in accord with the majority
position that there can be no reimbursement of expenses to ap-
pointed counsel in the absence of an authorizing statute. This
is not to say that the issue of reimbursement of expenses is
not being contested. In one instance known to the writer, a
lawyer has made it a practice in every case in which he is ap-
pointed to defend an indigent to present motions to the court for
cash allowances for investigative facilities and other services
similar to those the prosecution has at its disposal. To this date
none of the motions has been granted, but it is significant that
the issue is being raised in the courts.
The proposed Code of Criminal Procedure also has little to
say regarding expenses incurred in defense of the indigent. Ar-
ticles 512 and 513 of the proposed code deal with appointment
of counsel at the trial level and before. The only mention of
compensation or reimbursement is in the last sentence of each
article: "The defendant shall not be required to pay for such
representation." This, of course, says nothing about reimburse-
ment of expenses by the state.
Records of the Louisiana State Law Institute, the body
charged with the revision of the Criminal Procedure Code, indi-
cate that the subject of reimbursement was considered.2 7 How-
ever, the decision was made to eliminate any reference to reim-
bursement of appointed attorneys based on the conclusion that
the matter would be more appropriately dealt with by general
legislation placed in title 15 of the Revised Statutes of Louisi-
ana. An additional consideration was the failure of the 1964
Legislature to pass any of four bills proposing the establishment
of a Public Defender System.2 8
The question will probably arise in future sessions of the
legislature as awareness of the problem continues to grow. Con-
sider, for example, the following excerpt from the just-published
study of indigent defense by the American Bar Foundation. 29
26. 43 La. 991, 10 So. 382 (1891).
27. LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REvI-
SION, Expos8d des Motifs No. 18, Title XIV, Right to Counsel, 14-16 (March 16,
1962).
28. 1964 Louisiana Legislature: H.B. 937, 262, 1171, 1172.
29. See SiLVEESTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR (1965).
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"The difference in compensation among states and even
within them raises questions of equal protection for indi-
gent defendants. Lack of reimbursement of expenses is es-
pecially disturbing, since the appointed lawyer faces the
dilemma of cutting short his investigation or contributing
his funds in addition to his time. Some lawyers, especially
the younger ones, can ill afford such cash outlays. For in-
stance, two lawyers from a rural parish in Louisiana, ap-
pointed in a rape case, (a capital case), had the expense of
a three day trial, an appeal to the Supreme Court of Lou-
isiana, an application for a writ of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court, and an appeal to the federal court of
appeals. 12 Such a system is unfair not only to lawyers, but
also to their clients to the extent it hampers the lawyers'
best efforts."
"[Footnote 12:
"[One of the lawyers wrote a long letter about the case,
which included the following paragraph.
"['The local Bar Association was kind enough to pick up
a collection to pay for printed briefs in the State Supreme
Court. These are not necessary, but to adequately impress
the Court, it is a good idea to have them printed. The Sher-
iff of our Parish was kind enough to transport us to Baton
Rouge, along with the District Attorney, for the Habeas
Corpus hearing. However, we will have to transport our-
selves to New Orleans (220 miles) in connection with the
5th Circuit Court of Appeals argument.']"80
In summary of the present state of affairs in Louisiana, it
can be said that no reimbursement is now being made directly,
although some courts may favor counsel appointed in criminal
cases with appointments in remunerative civil matters.81 Diffi-
culties of the present policy are being recognized and some effort
is apparently being made to correct the situation.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LOUISIANA
A recent study in the state of methods of defending indigents
accused of crime suggests a strong feeling by judges, prosecu-
tors, and attorneys that there should be some procedure by which
30. 1 id. at 16.
31. 2 id. at 307, n.20.
1 966]
704 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW (Vol. XXVI
assigned counsel can recover out-of-pocket expenses.3 2 The gen-
eral opinion is that the present system is unfair to appointed
counsel in requiring him to bear all the cost of an obligation
that should be borne by society generally.,38 There is also an
underlying belief that the system as it now operates may be
unfair to the indigent in that it limits in some ways the quality
of his defense.3 4
Improvement in the present situation is within the control
of the legislature, which will have to make the eventual choice of
method. The methods available include continuance of the as-
signed counsel system with allowances from the state for ex-
penses, a completely new system of public defenders adequately
financed, or a combination of the two.
Experience in other states has shown that the assigned coun-
sel system tends to break down in densely populated areas.35
This can be seen, in our own state, in New Orleans. There a pri-
vate defender office has been established which appears to be
performing satisfactorily, although it has a need for more
funds.86 The reason for its establishment seems to have been
that the case burden on individual lawyers was becoming too
heavy for them to give adequate attention to indigent defense
and still maintain their regular practice.
However, since there is a much smaller incidence of crime
in the rural parishes,8 7 it would seem that the expense of main-
taining a full-time public defender there could not be justified.
It would be wiser to retain the present system of assigned coun-
sel in rural parishes, provided, of course, that money is made
available to pay out-of-pocket expenses. The money should come
from the state rather than the local level, as use of the latter
source for funds in other jurisdictions has generally led to wide-
spread inequalities.8 8 A system of funding on a statewide basis
would insure at least that counsel in every area of the state could
count on receiving the same kind of treatment.
There would need to be safeguards to prevent unnecessary
or extravagant use of expense funds. One suggested method is
32. 2 id. at 291, 297, 300.
33. 2 id. at 291, 296-97, 300-01, 307.
34. 2 id. at 283-308.
35. 1 id. at 63.
36. 2 id. at 301.
37. 1 id. at 63.
38. 1 id. at 16.
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for appointed counsel to submit expense itemizations to the judge
for approval and concurrent order to pay. This gives the lawyer
a degree of freedom to operate depending upon the facts of the
particular case, which is better than having him bound by strictly
interpreted terms as to what is acceptable and what is not. The
method allows the judge to use his discretion in fixing reim-
bursement at a fair rate for the work done so that no one will
be able to collect for clearly unjustified expenditures.
Where there is a public defender system, expenses should be
paid on the basis of an annual budget to assure use of funds in
the cases where they are most needed. A permanent, salaried
investigator might help to reduce the cost of the entire operation.
A further reduction of costs would result if public defenders
and assigned counsel were allowed the free use of the State
Crime Laboratory and the assistance of its personnel. This
should produce a substantial saving. In addition, some form
of discovery device in criminal trials"9 would reduce expendi-
tures for investigators and further diminish the cost of defend-
ing indigents.
All these suggestions can be used in Louisiana to create a
program for the defense of indigents at a reasonable cost to the
state. The hope. of change from present practices seems to lie
wit'h a legislature responsive to public opinion that is sufficiently
educated in the realities of administering criminal justice. A
change is imperative in order to secure a fair system of crim-
inal justice for both. the indigent accused and the attorney se-
lected to aid him in his defense.
Walter G. Strong, Jr.
POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES AND WAIVER OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
Each of the states and the federal government has its own
system of criminal procedure. One of the most important and
most publicized aspects of criminal procedure is that which
39. C1. Louisell, Criminal Di .cgver" Dimmq Roof Qr Appartt? .4Q C ,AL
L. REv. 56 (1961).
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